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Daily Intelligence Summary Iraq – Friday April 8 2005

Review Period: 062000 April - 072000 April 2005

Overview



The tempo of insurgent activity across IRAQ during the review period highlights the ongoing threat to MNFI, ISF, contractors and local nationals involved in the reconstruction effort. Attacks are also becoming more effective, as insurgents refine their TTPs and apply them to a wider range of targets. The progress of the new political arrangements in Iraq may provoke AIF activity aimed at disrupting it before it gains further momentum. The approach

of the Ba'ath Party anniversary and the two year anniversary of the fall of the Saddam regime may further inflame the situation.

**ROC C2 - INTEL:
 TOP FIVE HOTSPOTS**

- ↑** 1. **BAGHDAD: IDF THREAT WARNING**
- ↑** 2. **AR-RAMADI: IDF THREAT, FF TRANSIT POINT**
- ↑** 3. **MOSUL: IED, SAF & AMBUSHES**
- 4. **SAMARRA: DAISY CHAINED IED THREAT ON MSRs & ASRs**
- ↑** 5. **NORTH BABIL: FF TRANSIT POINT, IED & VBIED THREAT**

↑ INCREASING	■ HIGH
→ NO CHANGE	■ MODERATE
↓ DECREASING	■ LOW



CURRENT AS OF: 07 APR 05

Produced by: ROC C2 INTEL

INTERNATIONAL ZONE

The increase in successful complex insurgent attacks could renew AIF confidence in its ability to attack harder and more attractive targets including the International Zone (IZ). IDF attacks also remain a constant threat, particularly as the political process gains momentum and AIF cells look for ways to disrupt the transition and directly target the new government.

BAGHDAD AREA

General Situation

AIF activity was concentrated on MSRs during the reporting period with seven of thirteen incidents occurring on main routes. The majority of the incidents were relatively minor and there were no complex attacks. There appeared to be no AIF activity connected with the TNA sitting. The threat of civil unrest arising from large demonstrations is increasing.

Baghdad



There were seven incidents on MSRs during the reporting period. There were two IED attacks on Route HUSKIES, one in Zone 35 and another in Zone 54. There was a SAF attack on a patrol on Route CARDINALS in Zone 33N and another on a static MNFI patrol on Route FORCE in Zone 28, one on a civilian vehicle on Route IRISH IVO VCP 1 and another on an MNFI patrol on Route HUSKIES in Zone 54.

There is a possibility of large-scale demonstrations by political and religious organisations over the next few days. A 'Million Man March' is being advertised in SADR City (Zone 21) for 9 Apr 05, the second anniversary of the Coalition Forces' entry into BAGHDAD. This advertising coincides with an increase in

anti-western propaganda and graffiti in that area.

The BAGHDAD City Council has nominated Deputy Mayor IBRAHIM to replace Mayor TAMIMI. Legal action regarding the action by the BAGHDAD Provincial Council to keep Mayor TAMIMI in power is still pending.

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Significant Activity

061527Apr Zone 33N. SAF attack on MNFI patrol on Route CARDINALS at GR MB 25600 85700.

061642Apr Zone 33N. IDF impacts reported IVO MNFI patrol.

061702Apr Zone 47. IED attack on MNFI patrol at GR MB 42100 73900.

061758Apr Zone 35. IED attack on MNFI patrol on Route HUSKIES at GR MB 24200 87800.

061858Apr Zone 79. IED attack on local national vehicle at GR MB 29040 57570.

062058Apr Zone 125. IDF attack on Camp TAJI.

062112Apr Zone 54. IED attack on MNFI convoy on Route HUSKIES at GR MB 34800 87800.

062113Apr Zone 28. SAF attack on static MNFI patrol on Route FORCE at GR MB 34900 90300.

062159Apr Zone 91. IED cleared on MSR TAMPA at GR MC 28800 17900. IED consisted of a single artillery round.

070255Apr Zone 26. IED cleared on Route SENATORS at GR MB 43340 78240. IED consisted of a single artillery round.

070743Apr Zone 96. IED attack on MNFI patrol at GR MC 34900 22800.

071015Apr Zone 79. IED cleared at GR MB 37410 62410. IED consisted of a single artillery round.

071015Apr Zone 79. IED cleared on MSR JACKSON at GR MB 40700 57700. IED consisted of two mortar rounds concealed in a burlap sack.

071230Apr Zone 5NW. SAF attack on DOD Convoy on Route IRISH at GR MB 32900 82700.

071419Apr Zone 88. IED attack on MNFI patrol at GR MC 12290 03090.

071630Apr Zone 54. SAF attack on MNFI patrol on Route HUSKIES at GR MB 31700 87500.

Route Status

MNFI threat level on all MSRs in BAGHDAD is medium.

MNFI threat level on Route CARDINALS is high between GR MB 17652 85062 and MB 26766 85831. This section of road is considered no-go.

Route HUSKIES has a number of large craters at the side of the road at GR MB 1917 8588. Road is passable at that location.

Route HUSKIES has damage to the eastbound lane at MB 16930 83692. Road is passable at that location.

The westbound lane of Route HUSKIES is closed at GR MB 16740 84060 due to an IED which has destroyed that part of the road. There is a traffic diversion in place.

The northbound lane of MSR TAMPA at GR MB 49017 57250 (CP22A) has a bypass in place. Speed limit is 10mph.

The northbound lane of MSR TAMPA at GR MB 4265 6518 (CP26A) has a bypass in place due to a damaged bridge.

The southbound lane of MSR TAMPA at GR MB 281 713 (CP33A) has a bypass in place due to a damaged bridge.

The southbound lane of MSR TAMPA at GR MB 15288 82540 (CP39A) has a bypass in place due to a damaged bridge.

The DIYALA Bridge on Route PLUTO SOUTH at GR MB 5716 8211 has been repaired and is now open to traffic.


Summary

AIF activity has declined in scale over the last two days. It is not known how long this lull will last. In the past there has normally been a quiet period of between five and seven days between surges in activity. The threat of increased AIF activity related to the TNA remains high, especially towards the end of the week. There is also the possibility of political or religious demonstrations as various groups seek to air their grievances or draw attention to their cause. Media reports indicate, for example, that a Muqtadr AL SADR has called for a million man march to take place in SADR City in protest against the continuing Coalition presence in Iraq. There have been a number of small demonstrations in the city centre during the last couple of days, but these have been peaceful.

The threat of VBEID, VCIED and complex attack on western MSRs remains high. The AIF concentration of effort in ABU GHRAIB is likely to remain for some time. Attacks

against MNFI and civilian convoys can also be expected on MSR TAMPA, in the north of the region and around Zones 25 and 26 in the south.

Attacks 052000 - 062000 – Baghdad



MOSUL REGION

General Situation

There were eight incidents reported during the review period, including two VBIED attacks, five IDF attacks, one of which was combined with SAF, and a SAF attack. **ROC COMMENT** The period has seen a return to the baseline number of incidents expected. This is despite the heightened threat from attacks during the build up to two significant anniversaries, the fall of BAGHDAD and the former regime on 9 Apr, and the formation of the Ba’ath Party on 8 Apr 1947. However, the threat remains and the next 48-72 hours may well see a surge in AIF activity in the region. **COMMENT ENDS.**

No IED discoveries or actual detonations were reported during the period, in any part of the region. **ROC COMMENT** MNFI activities have been successful in the past few days in discovering weapons caches, including IED-making equipment, as well as engaging a number of AIFs placing the devices. It remains possible that this has impacted in the AIF groups’ ability to conduct such attacks. On the other hand, there appears to be no shortage of military-grade explosives in the area, as highlighted by the

frequent discoveries of UXO, but rather the available bomb-making expertise may have been affected for the short-term. It is assessed that AIF will return to the use of IEDs in the very near future as they remain their most successful weapon in an urban environment such as MOSUL city. **COMMENT ENDS.**



This period saw a number of IDF attacks against static locations, both in TAL'AFAR and MOSUL city. **ROC COMMENT** AIF groups may have opted to mount IDF attacks instead of IED, knowing that during this period of heightened threat, fewer soft targets will be on the ground and many personnel are likely to limit movements. IDF attacks are a way for AIF groups to prove that they can mount attacks in the heart of 'safe' locations. Although IDF attacks are inherently risky operations to the insurgents, as line-of-sight is not required and by firing only a couple of rounds from within built-up areas the firers can quickly make their escape into the mazes of local neighbourhoods. **COMMENT ENDS**

Nineveh Province

There were three incidents reported in NINEVEH Province during the period, all centred around TAL'AFAR. A VBIED struck a MNFI patrol and there were two reports of IDF attacks, including one complex attack involving SAF.

Open sources report that an IED attack on 6 Apr 05 on an IA bus resulted in the death of three and the wounding of over 44 IA soldiers returning to TAL'AFAR after carrying home their monthly pay. It was suggested that AIF were aware of this and targeted the bus specifically. We believe that this was an attempt to dissuade would-be recruits from joining the ISF.

Mosul Area

There were five incidents reported in MOSUL area, three of those being IDF attacks. There was one drive-by SAF attack and another VBIED detonation. Swift action on behalf of the MNFI patrol, once again, prevented the suicide bomber from getting too close to the patrol's vehicle before detonating the VBIED. The results was no friendly injuries or damages being reported.

New TTPs in the AOR

- IEDs encased in concrete (122 mm or 130 mm rounds) to blend in with natural surroundings.

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- Use of decoy devices in the form of IEDs or UXO, followed by the targeting of MNFI or EOD responders.
- More frequent use of VBIEDs and suicide attacks.
- Assassinations of locals in daylight hours, where the victim is driven to an area, forced out of the car and shot on the spot.

Significant Activities

- 062000Apr MNFI patrol received SAF and IDF at GR KF 726 290.
- 062030Apr MNFI reported one round of IDF in eastern MOSUL.
- 062044Apr MNFI reported a 107 mm rocket landed in northeast MOSUL but did not detonate. EOD recovered the round without incident.
- 062233Apr MNFI observed one 81 mm round impact in eastern MOSUL.
- 070947Apr MNFI patrol was struck by a VBIED IVO GR KF 723 299.
- 071105APR MNFI patrol received SAF from a vehicle at GR LF 383 202.
- 071257Apr MNFI reported a VBIED detonation at GR LF 376 206. The unit identified the vehicle early enough to fire warning shots, causing the vehicle to prematurely detonate.
- 071343Apr MNFI reported one round of IDF in TAL'AFAR.

Route Status

MSR TAMPA is considered to be a high threat route in MOSUL. Do not transit from GR LF 308 201 (BAGHDAD traffic circle) north to GR LF 306 255, (IVO YARMUK traffic circle). Bypass for TAMPA is Route SAAB and LEXUS.

Route LEXUS (north and south) - the threat from IED, VBIED and SAF attacks on this route remains high, especially as it is an alternative to MSR TAMPA.

Route LEXUS and Route SAAB intersection at the approach to Bridge 1 in MOSUL continues to be an ambush hotspot, with both SAF and RPG attacks coming from both sides of the road and from the mosque.

ASR SANTA FE from GR LF 250 256 east to GR LF 296 247 (YARMUK traffic circle) is closed to all traffic until further notice, due to high levels of enemy activity, including VBIEDs.

Heightened threat of IED on ASR SANTA FE (W). SANTA FE is considered 'no-go' at the moment. No movement advised from GR KF 682 278 to GR KF 741 300, due to increased levels of enemy activity IVO TAL' AFAR.

Outlook

- Heightened VBIED threat, particularly in the immediate areas of the traffic circles in west MOSUL.
- AIF will continue to develop TTPs in order to maximise the effectiveness of attacks.
- Increase in AIF targeting first responders and specialised EOD personnel.
- Increase in AIF targeting of ISF and local government figures.
- There may be an increase in AIF activity building up to the 9 Apr, which is the anniversary of the end of the war-fighting phase of operations and when BAGHDAD fell to MNFI troops. 8 Apr 05 is also the anniversary of the formation of the Ba'ath party.

Summary



The period has seen a return to the typical number of incidents reported, despite the threat warning about the possible increase in attacks during the build up to the second anniversary of the fall of the former regime on 9 Apr and the anniversary of the formation of the Ba'ath Party on 8 Apr. MNFI operations may well have disrupted AIF activity during the period, and the insurgents may have been forced to change their tactics, temporarily

moving away from IEDs and focussing on attacks on static locations.

The heightened threat remains, and the upcoming 48-72 hours may still see an increase in AIF activity centred on MOSUL and TAL'AFAR.

TIKRIT REGION

General Situation

There were 32 notable incidents during this review period. These included nine IEDs discovered six IED detonations, ten IDF, five DF one VCIED and one SAF attack. Attacks have doubled in the review period with a spike in IDF attacks primarily targeting FOBs NORMANDY, MCHENRY and SUMERALL. The sharp increase in attacks was seen across all three provinces as AIF almost singularly targeted MNFI forces. While

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IED detonations went up slightly, there was a dramatic increase in discoveries as MNFI and ISF conducted successful counter-IED operations.

At 2011 on the 06 Apr 05 TIKRIT Joint Coordination Centre reported a possible VCIED exploding in TIKRIT at GR LD 7401 2954. A patrol was nearby and moved to the location to secure the scene. Witnesses reported that the car, an orange and white taxi, had been in the area since 1830hrs when the two occupants of the vehicle stopped and checked under the car as if doing maintenance. The two occupants then got into a black Opel and left.

At 0745 on the 07 Apr 05 a patrol conducting route security north of BAIJI discovered three possible IEDs at GR LD 4365 9559. The IEDs were dirt mounds connected together with red detonation cord. Next to the three mounds was a crater from an IED that had detonated with body parts around the crater. A total of four IEDs were discovered daisy chained together, EOD detonated them in place. 200m south of the IEDs at GR LD 4364 9557 was another IED site that prematurely detonated on the people emplacing them. **ROC COMMENT** While the premature detonation indicates a lack of skill, the placement 200m from the daisy chain is consistent with other IED attacks targeting first responders. The one that detonated may well have been the one planned to go off and stop the target along side the daisy chain thus ensuring a higher casualty count. **COMMENT ENDS**

Significant Activities:

- 061524Apr Hand grenade attack in AD DULUIYAH at GR MC 27709 68616.
- 061711Apr IDF attack 7km south of HAWIJA.
- 061838Apr IED found on Route HEATHER northwest of the LSAA at GR MC 37146 59668.
- 061840Apr IED found in BAQUBAH IVO GR MC 674 335.
- 062014Apr SAF attack on a patrol in KIRKUK at GR ME 4606 2307.
- 062030Apr IED found 1km south of HAWIJA IVO GR LE 897 093.
- 062100Apr SAF attack on FOB BERNSTEIN GR MD 5341 6633.
- 062125Apr IED detonated north of BAQUBAH IVO GR MC 680 406.
- 062151Apr SAF attack on a patrol discovering AIF planting an IED in AD DULUIYAH IVO GR MC 277 691.
- 062221Apr IDF attack southeast of BAIJI at GR LD 6239 6485.

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062258Apr SAF attack in AL ABBARRAH IVO GR MC 6757.

062340Apr IED attack on patrol in KIRKUK at GR ME 4495 2185.

062350Apr IED found at in HAWIJA IVO GR LE 883 094.

070745Apr DF attack on FOB McHENRY IVO GR LE 9289 0775.

070750Apr IED attack on a patrol on Route TAMPA, 25km south of AS SHARQAT IVO GR LE 373 068.

070830Apr IED attack on a patrol 4km east of AD DULUIYAH at GR MC 3199 6962.

070900Apr IED found 9km south of BAIJI IVO GR LD 629 569.

070953Apr IDF attack 2km north of TAZA at GR ME 39930 06943.

071045Apr IED found on Route CHEYENNE at GR MC 5562 8468.

071157Apr IED attack on a patrol on Route VANESSA IVO GR MC 605 210.

071220Apr IDF attack on FOB WARRIOR at GR ME 4020 2505.

071238Apr IED attack on a patrol south of BAQUBAH at GR MC 641 297.

071250Apr IED detonation in south BAQUBAH IVO GR MC 635 285.

071315Apr SAF attack on a patrol west of KIRKUK IVO GR ME 365 238.

071330Apr IDF attack 2km north of TAZA IVO GR ME 384 092.

071340Apr IDF attack on FOB NORMANDY GR NC 5566 6007.

071507Apr IDF attack on FOB McHENRY IVO GR LD 929 077.

071510Apr IDF on FOB NORMANDY IVO GR NC 002 668.

070616Apr IDF attack on FOB SUMMERALL IVO LD 557 648.

070623Apr IDF attack on FOB WARHORSE IVO GR MC 637 399.

Route Status

MSR TAMPA 2 is classed as a high threat route in the area between BALAD and SAMARRA.

MSR TAMPA 3 is classed as a medium threat route in the vicinity of AD DUJAYL and AD DAWR.

MSR TAMPA 4 is classed as a high threat route between TIKRIT-BAYJI.

ASR CLEMSON is classed as a medium threat route.

ASR PEPPER is closed to CF and HGV traffic until further notice due to the bridge and road at GR MD 38933 46115 being damaged by flood water.

ASR DOVER is classed as a medium threat route.

ASR TACO is classed as a medium threat route.

ASR DETROIT is classed as a medium threat route.

ASR BLUE BABE is classed as a high threat route.

ASR CHEYENNE is classed as a medium threat route; however the incidents of IED and SAF attacks are on the increase IVO camp ASHRIF

ASR HERSHEY is classed as a high threat route; caution should be taken IVO GR LD 5363 8233 due to a large IED crater.

Summary

As predicted, enemy activity has increased substantially as we close in on a 72 hour period of key dates and follows a similar rise in attacks this time last year. FRE may mount surging operations in order to demonstrate viability and score an information victory on the eve of the anniversary of the founding of the Ba'ath party on 8 Apr 05. The proliferation of AIF attacks over the review period follows a similar trend in other regions as fifty percent of all attacks through out the ITO were IDF. The recent increase in targeting of MNFI patrols with DF and IEDs and today's targeting of FOBs with IDF may represent an AIF attempt to limit collateral damage and prevent a further loss of popular support. Recent threat reporting indicates that AIF in the BAQUBAH area are targeting FOB WARHORSE with a VBIED over the next five days. IEDs remain the most significant threat to MNFI and PSCs and the VBIED threat remains high throughout the TIKRIT region.

RAMADI REGION

General Situation

This has been another reasonably busy reporting period in the operational area, which has seen a total of thirty one incidents over the review period, including fourteen attacks. The attacks consisted of four IED attacks; including one mine, and two IED finds; one of which was also a mine. The remainder of the incidents consisted of one SAF incident and seven IDF attacks.

Significant Activities

- 061348Apr MNFI were attacked with an IED 20km west of CAMP KOREAN VILLAGE at GR ES 673 540. The device was assessed as being made up of three artillery rounds. **ROC COMMENT** Due to the remoteness of western AL ANBAR, the AIF have more time to place devices and so can use larger IEDs than in an area with a higher MNFI concentration. **COMMENT ENDS.**
- 061412Apr MNFI observed IDF impacts 1km west of HIT.
- 061502Apr CAMP HIT was attacked with one round of IDF.
- 061505Apr MNFI struck a mine 5km south of HUSYABAH at GR FU 796 033.
- 061705Apr MNFI discovered an IED under the north ends of the KHALIDIYAH BRIDGE at GR LB 611 965. The IED was made up of one 122m mortar with a washing machine timer attached.
- 061725Apr A PSC was attacked with an IED 54km east of RUTBAH at GR FS 757 567.
- 061735Apr MNFI observed three mortars being launched 9.5km north of CAMP AL QAIM. Although the intended target for the attack is unknown, several individuals were seen on a nearby rooftop observing the suspected impact area. **ROC COMMENT** These individuals were probably conducting forward observation. This is now common practice for the AIF in AL ANBAR PROVINCE. **COMMENT ENDS.**
- 062000Apr MNFI observed IDF impacts to the north of HAQLANIYAH.
- 062007Apr CAMP BLUE DIAMOND was attacked with a rocket.
- 062027Apr MNFI observed IDF impacts to the north of CAMP HABBANIYAH.
- 062035Apr MNFI observed IDF impacts 9km northeast of RAMADI.

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- 062345Apr MNFI at the GOVERNMENT CENTRE in central RAMADI were attacked with SAF by two insurgents. The unit returned fire.
- 070922Apr MNFI engaged a civilian vehicle that approached a patrol at speed and failed to stop in western FALLUJAH at GR LB 846 916.
- 070945Apr MNFI engaged a civilian vehicle that approached a patrol at speed and failed to stop on route MAVERICK, 5km west of HIT at GR KC 924 228.
- 071023Apr MNFI were attacked with an IED on route GREMLIN, 4.5km southeast of CAMP RAMADI at GR LB 387 965.
- 071050Apr MNFI engaged a civilian vehicle that approached them at speed and failed to stop on MSR MOBILE, 35km west of CAMP KOREAN VILLAGE at GR ES 506 525.
- 071130Apr MNFI discovered a mine on a minor road 9km west of CAMP AL QAIM at GR FT 885 954.
- 071225Apr MNFI engaged a civilian vehicle that approached them at speed and failed to stop on MSR MOBILE 3km north of RAMADI at GR LC 434 040

Route Status

MSRs MICHIGAN and MOBILE have a high risk of VBIED along the FALLUJAH - RAMADI corridor.

MSR MOBILE has a high threat of IEDs in the area of the junctions with ASR GOLDEN and around the towns of SAQLAWIYAH, NASSER WA SALAAM and ABU GHRAIB.

MSR MOBILE has large potholes but is passable near the THAR THAR CANAL, IVO GR 735 010.

On MSR MOBILE IVO SAQLAWIYAH at GR LB 770 975 there are several red oil drums dug in to the side of the road.

On MSR MOBILE IVO SAQLAWIYAH the median has been dug up and has left a prime area for concealing IEDs.

ASR LONG ISLAND has been the scene of fresh digging at GR LB 381 796.

ASR NEWPORT route conditions are becoming worse, there are numerous potholes and cracked pavement surfaces.

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ASR LINCOLN is considered extremely dangerous by the military. There is an increased threat of IEDs on ASR LINCOLN near the intersection with ASR CHICAGO.

IVO HIT all minor roads are in extremely poor condition.

ASR URANIUM is in poor condition along its entire length.

ASR BRONZE has a high threat of attack especially IVO the HIT traffic circle and the junction for AL ASAD.

ASR PHOENIX has a high MINE and IDF threat at the junction with ASR RAPTOR.

The area IVO ASR PHOENIX / ASR BRONZE junction has a high IED threat.

ASRs TIN, PHOENIX and URANIUM IVO HADITHAH are considered extremely dangerous by the military. There has been an increased use of MINES on ASR TIN.

There is a high threat of MINES on all routes IVO HUSAYBAH and AL QAIM. MEMPHIS BRIDGE in AL QAIM has been demolished.

AMIRIYAH PONTOON BRIDGE is at high risk from attack.

All MSR/ASRs IVO AR RUTBAH are considered as high risk routes by the military, and have been the scene of recent IED attacks.

Summary

The level of insurgent activity has fallen slightly over the review period as the AIF move from a period of hostility into one of re-arming and reinforcing their existing structure. A large amount of daily activity continues to be made up of detentions, cache finds and escalation of force incidents, indicating that the proactive stance of the MNFI in western IRAQ since the elections appears to be paying dividends.

It is likely that AIF will utilise more stand off attacks over the coming weeks as MNFI restrictions on movement prevent entry into the major cities. This is likely to take the form of an increase in IDF attacks, together with a step up in sniper activity. Consequently MNFI and PSCs will be more vulnerable when stationary, particularly on the fringes of cities such as RAMADI and FALLUJAH.

The AIF are now routinely using forward observation posts as a means of better directing their IDF attacks. Whilst this use of basic military tactics shows the continued evolution of insurgent groups across the AL ANBAR PROVINCE, it is unlikely to have much effect as the AIF rarely use more than three rounds of rapid IDF before departing the scene of the attack.

DIWANIYAH REGION

General Situation

Another very quiet day in this operational area with only one incident reported during the period.

There is a continued high threat of IED attacks on MSR TAMPA and along all MSRs and ASRs transiting NORTH BABIL, especially between CP20A and CP28A. IEDs are still the preferred form of attack in this region.

Wasit

The imminent removal of the WAIT Chief of Police for alleged corruption has caused tension between the IP and other security agencies in AL KUT. The Chief, Gen HANEEN is unlikely to leave his post voluntarily, following advice from friends in high places.

Najaf

Reports have suggested that there were possibly in excess of 2000 people walking to NAJAF from KARBALA and AD DIWANIYAH on 6 Apr 05. A number were thought to have been women heading from AD DIWANIYAH, though a larger proportion were men, dressed in black, with green belts heading from the direction of KARBALA. There were no reports that any were armed. **ROC COMMENT** The reasons for the movement of large numbers of people to NAJAF are unclear. It is possibly to take part in celebrations commemorating the fall of SADDAM HUSSEIN on 09 Apr 05 or the anniversary of the Ba'ath Party. It is also possible that some may be connected to the planned demonstration in NAJAF on 09 Apr 05 by members of the MM. **COMMENT ENDS**

Qadisiyah

Late reporting indicates that up to 40 people travelling in seven vehicles, were stopped by the IP in AD DIWANIYAH during the late evening of 06 Apr 05. Although claiming to be IP, the men had no documentation. Having talked their way through the checkpoint, the ING and IP eventually detained these men at a CP near AN NAJAF bridge, where seven AK-47s and 20 RPG launchers and many other weapons were eventually discovered.

Route Status

MSR TAMPA is assessed as medium threat due to sustained AIF activity, increasing to high threat from CP 20A to CP 28A due to a marked increase in IED attacks along this section. The highest threat to both MNFI and PSD convoys remain the unmanned CPs. Northbound lane closed at CP 12A (GR MB 552 116) due to damage.

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ASR JACKSON is assessed as medium threat level by MNFI due to the reduction in attacks along this route. It is recommended that this route is still avoided between GR MB 402 655 (junction of ASR JACKSON and MSR TAMPA) and GR MB 439 124 (ASR PHILADELPHIA) due to the high IED threat.

ASR CLEVELAND is assessed as high threat due to poor route security. The bridge at GR MB 334 288 (AL MUSAYYIB) is scheduled for repair.

ASR BISMARCK from the north of AS SUWAYRAH (GR MB 790 430) to BAGHDAD is assessed as high threat level to due to sustained AIF activity. This route should not be used by PSCs and the suggested alternative is ASR KIEV to MSR TAMPA.

A section of ASR BISMARCK from GR MB 416 654 to GR MB 442 646 is a single lane dirt road which only supports vehicles with a width no greater than that of a HMMWV.

Current intelligence suggests that illegal VCPs are still being established north of AL KUT, especially after dark.

ASR MIAMI between KARBALA and AN NAJAF is assessed as high risk due to an increase in AIF activity.

ASR SAN JUAN is high risk due to dirt mounds at GR MB 245 325 and GR MB 243 293 and a ditch in road at GR MB 120 260.

ASR TOPEKA is assessed as high threat due to organized crime elements and Wahabbi insurgents, predominantly due to its proximity to the Iranian border.

ASR PHILADELPHIA is not trafficable for Tankers and Heavy Equipment Transporters Systems (HETS).

ASR FONTANA is assessed as high threat due to an increased threat of AIF activity. There is a single lane bridge at GR MB 6621 3007.

ASR KIEV is assessed as medium threat due to a continued threat of attack by AIF.

KIEV BRIDGE at GR NA 09746 90326 is now completed and is protected by ISF on both sides of the bridge.

Significant Activities

060830Apr Cache discovery at GR MA 532 310 east of ABU SUKHAYR.

061850Apr IED attack south of AL YUSUFIYAH GR MB 290 575.

062030Apr One local national detained IVO KARBALA GR MB 192 059.

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- 071015Apr One 155mm round IED discovered northeast of AL YUSUFIYAH GR MB 374 624
- 071015Apr IED discovered in southbound lane on ASR JACKSON at GR MB 407 577 in AL MAHMUDIYAH.
- 071138Apr IED discovered (two 120mm mortar and long range cordless phone base) north of AL HASWAH at GR MB 400 455.

Summary



The highest threat to MNFI and PSD convoys still remains within the NORTH BABIL region, along the stretch of MSR TAMPA which runs from CP 28A, along the towns of MAHMUDIYAH, LUTAFIYAH and HASWAH. The effectiveness and lethality of the attacks continues to be low. The ISF also continues to be a major target of attacks, the AIF trying to discredit their ability to protect the civilian population.

The reported gathering of possible demonstrators in AN NAJAF is a cause for concern. Insurgent elements may take this opportunity if given, to carry out plans that were apparently foiled during the Arba'een festivities. Targets may include MNFI bases in the area, IP stations and any large gatherings of the Shia population. The additional presence of large numbers of the MM in the city will further increase tension.

BASRAH REGION

General Situation

A busier reporting period in southern IRAQ; significant activity constituted a demonstration and an IED in DHI QAR, an IDF attack in MAYSAN and an IED in BASRAH City. Demonstrations are still expected to take place in large cities on 09 Apr 05.

Dhi Qar

It was reported that at 062359Apr05 an IED detonated in NASIRIYAH at GR PV 189 365, which is near a Ministry of Agriculture building and an IPS station.

UNCLASSIFIED/LIMDIS/FOUO

A Mahdi Militia (MM) demonstration was reported from NASIRIYAH at 062130Apr05 in AL-BUBIY square at GR PV 196 352. There were approximately 300 people, some armed. Initially there was a suggestion that the demonstration was anti-MNFI sparked by the news of 3 BASRAH MM members being killed; this is yet to be confirmed. The police regained control of the situation by late afternoon.

Muthanna

More reporting has indicated that the Office of the Martyr al-SADR (OMS) in SAMAWAH is propagating anti-MNFI sentiment. An unconfirmed report states that a meeting will take place in the next few days between OMS officials and local authorities (possible Governorate members and the Chief of Police) with the reported motive of pushing for MNFI withdrawal from MUTHANNA. It is thought that awareness of the current changeover of troops responsible for the Province may have spurred this increase of hostility.

Route Status

AL AMARAH is out of bounds to all soft-skin green and white vehicles; all other movement to be cleared through 1 WG BG Ops Room.

AL AMARAH from GR QA 042 241 to GR QA 042 246 is out of bounds to all ground movement between 1800-0600hrs until further notice due to threat of attack.

There is a height restriction at AL AMARAH Pontoon Bridge, at GR QA 034 258.

No stopping within 500m of leprosy colony at GR PA 927 213.

Mission essential moves only recommended through Route TOPEKA due to increased threat.

Bypass in place through Route TAMPA from GR QU 610 376 to GR QU 421 669 due to blown bridge.

Road from GR PA 997 173 to GR PA 997 181 has collapsed.

400m radius of GR PA 9895 2185 is now for transit only.

Avoid 200m radius around the OMS Building at GR QU 705 805 in BASRAH City.

Stopping not recommended on Route TOPEKA between GR QV 179 888 and GR QV 169 891.

GR QU 714 797 to GR QU 692 819 is out of bounds to all vehicles due to increased threat.

UNCLASSIFIED/LIMDIS/FOUO

Route between AL MAYMUNAH (GR PA 865 070) and AL FARTUS (GR PV 000 844) is out of bounds due to increased threat.

The slip road GR QU 50079 77479 – GR QU 50364 77020 to the north of Route HEXAGON is out of bounds until further notice. A bypass is accessible.

200m radius of GR PA 989 185 is recommended OOB until further notice.

Summary

A much busier period in our operational area with reporting from all four provinces. Although none of the attacks can be confidently attributed to specific groups, the recent prominence of the MM in all four capitals should not be overlooked. The heightened level of activity is expected to continue for the next few days.

Various branches of the MM are reported to be actively coordinating demonstrations for the 09 Apr 05. It seems fairly clear that they will be protesting against foreign ‘occupation’ and it is assessed that the enthusiasm this generates could lead to attacks being staged against the international community up to and after this date.

Threat Warnings

- Increased threat of IEDs throughout the operational area, in particular Routes HEART, TOPEKA and BASRAH City.
- There remains a threat against southern infrastructure and those working to repair it. The threat is particularly aimed against oil infrastructure.
- Threat against contractors and LECs.
- Kidnapping threat against westerners, particularly extant within the cities and against who appear to be soft targets.
- Carjacking/ambush threat is extant particularly on MSR TAMPA / ASR TOPEKA. There is a particular threat on ASR TOPEKA in the vicinity of AL AMARAH, MAJARR AL KABIR and Northern BASRAH.

Political Situation and Event Analysis

What happened: AL-JAAFARI named as Prime Minister

IBRAHIM AL-JAAFARI has been named Prime Minister of Iraq’s Transitional Government, appointed by the newly sworn-in Presidency Council. Outgoing Interim Prime Minister AYAD ALLAWI has resigned but will continue his work until AL-JAAFARI names his government. This AL-JAAFARI has said he expects to do within the next two weeks. “Today represents a big step forward for Iraq and a big responsibility for me,” he said. TALABANI addressed the TNA after being sworn in: “We will rebuild the Iraqi government on principles of democracy, human rights... and the Islamic identity of the Iraqi government.”

Why it matters

The momentum that began with the naming of HAJIM AL-HASSANI as the President of the Assembly, and continued on Tuesday with the appointment of the Presidency Council, is now firmly established and only emphasises the nature of these announcements as effectively a package. Today's announcement is as expected. AL-JAAFARI's appointment (its ratification is a formality) so soon after the above is, as detailed in yesterday's brief, an indication that the formation of the Council of Ministers is close to a conclusion, and this is backed up by AL-JAAFARI's indication that this will be made within the next two weeks. This differs from previous declarations of intent (which were subject to constant revision and soon ignored) in that there is now a prescribed (four-week) time limit. The Council of Ministers is recommended by the Prime Minister and named by the Presidency Council, and after this both the Council of Ministers and Prime Minister are ratified by a simple majority (which will be a formality). If AL-JAAFARI fails to put forward his Cabinet by then he is de-selected.




TALABANI's statement about the Islamic identity of the Iraqi government may cause nervy ill-informed comment about an Islamic takeover of Iraq, but is no more than the TAL allows nor than should be expected: Islam will be a principal source for legislation but not the exclusive source. His statement, however, will hearten the Shi'a and the Sunnis, some of whose number may express concern at being 'ruled' by a Kurd (i.e. not an Arab).

There has of course been some confusion in the western media about what to call this government: this is the *Transitional* National Government/Prime Minister etc. not *Interim* (which they replace). Furthermore, TALABANI is not a permanent President but can best be described as the Transition-era President.


How long is AL-JAAFARI Prime Minister for? As Prime Minister of the Transitional Government, AL-JAAFARI's tenure will last until the formation of a permanent government, the deadline for which is December 31 2005 (though if the drafting of the constitution is extended by six months, so will this deadline).

How long is TALABANI President for? The Presidency Council is, in the wording of Iraq's administrative law, part of the Transitional Government. The length of service is only implicit in the TAL as the details of the permanent government and presidency are left to the new constitution.


Attacks 052000 - 062000 - North



Attacks 052000 - 062000 - Central



Attacks 052000 - 062000 - South



Weather (in C/F)

- In Northern Iraq the high temperature will be 26/80 and low 11/51.
- In Central Iraq the high temperature will be 30/86 and low 13/56.
- In Southern Iraq the high temperature will be 31/89 and the low 16/62.

Further Dissemination Prohibited

Please remember, these reports are classified “UNCLASSIFIED//LIMDIS//FOUO” This means that you cannot give them to reporters. This means that you cannot give them to friends outside of the country. This means that you cannot give it to people within your firm that have nothing to do with Iraq. You also DO NOT have permission to forward this report to any other addressees. Thank you.